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THE USES OF AMBIVALENCE: REFLECTIONS ON THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION*
PAUL J. MISHKINt

I am deeply honored to be here today. There is, of course, an element of homecoming in returning here to the school and the people
with whom I spent so many good years. It is especially affecting to be
invited back to give the Owen J. Roberts Lecture.
The Supreme Court as an institution was very important to Owen
J. Roberts, 1 and I have chosen to speak on that subject. I shall focus on
a group of cases dealing with the constitutionality of race-conscious
governmental affirmative action, sometimes called "reverse discrimination." But my emphasis is not upon the substantive results; rather it is
upon the Court as an institution in American society, and upon the
judicial techniques of that institution in dealing with this difficult constitutional and social issue.
It.has often been noted that the Supreme Court stands at the intersection of principle and politics. On the one hand, its power and its
function are rationalized by its obligation to decide in terms of principle. This implies, at least, that the Court must be able to justify its
results in terms of principle. On the other hand, the issues posed involve broad societal problems, and the decisions of the Court have an
impact that the Justices cannot ignore (and probably should not if they
could). The demands of a wise or politic result may be in tension with
the dictates of principle. The issue of the. constitutionality of affirmative
action poses in particularly intense form one instance of that conjuncture. The issue, and the Court's modes of dealing with it, are not typi* This is a revised version of the Owen J. Roberts Annual Memorial Lecture delivered in
Philadelphia on October 21, 1982.
t Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. A.B. 1947,
LL.B. 1950, Columbia University.
I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues, Jesse Choper, William K. Muir, Jr.,
Robert Post, Michael E. Smith, and Jan Vetter, for their helpful comments on various drafts of
the manuscript, and to my wife Mildred Mishkin, for that and much more.
I would also like to record my deep appreciation for the warm reception and generous hospitality accorded us in Philadelphia by all those associated with the Roberts Lecture.
I See, e.g., 0. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1951); Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). This is, of course (and one would hope needless
to say), not to give any credence to the famous supposed "switch in time" on the validity of
minimum wage legislation. See id. at 313-17; Griswold, Owen J. Roberts as a Judge, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 332, 340-45 (1955).
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cal or even usual. But the close examination of this extraordinary situation yields insights.
The issue of affirmative action or reverse discrimination is, needless to say, highly emotionally charged. I do not propose to deal today
with the merits. I do not know that I could add usefully to what has
already been said on the subject, and I doubt very much that I would
make any converts in either direction, even if this lecture ran much
longer than it will. At the same time, it will be impossible not to touch
on those merits. To avoid any misunderstanding, let me state at the
outset that I served as special counsel to the Petitioner, the Regents of
the University of California, in the Bakke case in the United States
Supreme Court.2 The views that I am expressing here, however, are
entirely my own. In fact, the views I am expressing now are somewhat
different from those I personally held at the time of the litigation and
immediately thereafter-as I intend to suggest by the use of the term
"Reflections" in the title of this lecture.
My view is that the Court has achieved good results on this issue.
I have some questions about how those results have been achieved, and
it is on that lack of congruence between results and methods that I shall
ultimately focus. That statement of position may predispose some to
reject everything that follows. There are those who believe that any
race-conscious measures by government are wrong, immoral, and unconstitutional. These people may feel that (at least once a case arose)
the Court's duty was to address that issue on the merits, that if it had
done so there was only one principled answer-namely that no raceconscious action is permissible-and that any other response was a
shirking of the very responsibility which justifies the Court's power.
Again, I do not propose to debate this position here, either in its absolute form or in more limited versions that might permit race-conscious
measures as specific redress for race-consciously inflicted injuries. This
is an issue of much larger scope that I propose to treat today. It is an
issue that has divided Professors Herbert Wechsler and Alexander
3
Bickel, and they have debated it in terms that I cannot improve upon.
If the conception of a "principled" resolution is one that will not admit
of the possibility that transitional race-conscious measures may be suffi-

'

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). I was senior author of the
Brief for Petitioner. On the merits of the issues, including particularly the justification for programs of special admissions, the substance of the brief represented my views then, and those views
remain essentially unchanged today.
I See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49-65 (1962); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW xiii-xiv (1961); see also Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), reprinted in H. WECHSLER, supra
at 3.
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ciently necessary to be acceptable, I cannot respond better to such a
conception than to say, with Professor Bickel, that no viable society can
be governed by that rigorous a standard." Although he argued against
the validity of affirmative action, and indeed once filed an eloquent
brief attacking such programs, I think he would have agreed that his
was not the only position open to the Court.5
I believe there is a less assertive sense of the word "principle" than
Professor Wechsler's that may still make its demands-though perhaps
only demands of generality and fidelity-requiring sincere efforts to
reason in terms of precepts that transcend the individual case and that
are conscientiously seen as governing in all cases within their stated
terms. Even those demands, as we shall see, may pose some difficulties
in the area we are examining. But for those who subscribe to the more
absolute view, I can only suggest that even from their point of view
they may still find it interesting to examine how the Court, with a
majority apparently willing to allow at least some such race-conscious
action, managed to reach that result without a resounding reinforcement of the principle of race-consciousness.
There are others who might join issue from the other end of the
spectrum. They may feel that the Court has insufficiently validated affirmative action, that race-conscious remedial measures have been deprived of the approval and support to which they are entitled, and that
the Court's disposition has made efforts to advance such measures and
to enforce them in operation unnecessarily difficult. On one level, I can
only say that I understand but do not presently share that position. On
another, however, a major element of this lecture will focus on whether,
if the Court cannot find or is not prepared to announce a principled
basis which would support acceptance of less than that fully endorsing
position, it can then be justified in acting as it has.
Let me first briefly summarize the decisions in these cases; some or
all may be familiar. There are only four in the decade and a half since
'

A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 64.
As he said:
Is it not clear that our nation would be severely damaged-inwardly, not merely in
its external relations-if in the second half of the twentieth century it believed that
segregation of the races was neither right nor wrong; if it were committed to no
principle in the matter, one way or the other? But is it not equally clear-[and he
uses the example of the "benevolent quota" intended to preserve an integrated
housing situation; I would extend it, though he might not, to affirmative action of
the kind we are discussing]-that the problem of the association of the black and
white races will not always yield to principled resolution, that it must proceed
through phases of compromise and expedient muddling-through, or else fail of an
effective and peaceable outcome?

Id. at 64-65.
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affirmative action became widespread.' The immediately striking thing
about these four cases is that the Court avoided reaching the merits in
the first and the last, and failed to coalesce on a majority opinion for its
substantive decisions in the two in the middle. The most constant feature is the ambivalent signal which the Court has sent out. Not so
much the sound of an "uncertain trumpet" alone (although there was a
good deal of that) as one accompanied at crucial times by a clear note
of ambivalence.
The issue of the constitutional validity of affirmative action first
reached the Supreme Court in 1973 in the case of Defunis v. Odegaard,7 an attack on the special admissions program of the University
of Washington Law School under which specific minority groups were
given special preference for admission, with the goal that members of
such minorities amount to "approximately 15 to 20 percent" of the student body.' Marco DeFunis, a white applicant, was rejected although
he had better numerical credentials than virtually all of' the minority
students admitted. 9 The Washington Supreme Court upheld the state
law school's program against his constitutional attack, a majority finding the race-conscious special admissions policy sufficiently justified to
be valid.1"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, bringing the
case before it for review.1 1 But, after the case had been fully briefed
and argued orally, a 5-4 majority dismissed the case without passing on
the merits. It did so on the stated grounds that the controversy was
moot. 12 Defunis had been attending the University of Washington Law

School under court order pending the litigation. By the time the case
reached the United States Supreme Court, he was in his final year; he
entered the last quarter of that year a few days after oral argument.
The school had agreed that he would be permitted to finish that quarter even if the case were decided against him. On this basis, the majority concluded that DeFunis himself no longer had anything at stake,
and that the case was therefore moot and had to be dismissed without
passing on the merits.1"
' Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Defunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Id. at 347 (Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'o DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 32-37, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182-84 (1973).
'1 414 U.S. 1038 (1973).
, Defunis, 416 U.S. at 316, 319-20.
l Id. at 315-17. Justice Brennan dissented on the mootness issue in an opinion joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall. He argued on the technical level that unexpected events
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Professor Bickel has provided one possible explanation, if not justification, for such a dismissal. Building on the work of Professor
Charles Black, 14 he developed the idea that a Supreme Court decision
holding a particular statute or course of action not unconstitutional is
often taken as importing much more-as connoting that the Supreme
Court is affirmatively legitimating the challenged governmental action.' 5 He asserted, with much force, that this can precipitate a dilemma in which the Court feels called upon ultimately to uphold challenged action, and yet does not wish to give that action the added
impetus that its imprimatur of legitimacy would provide. Under those
circumstances, he said, the Court should, and often does, find means to
avoid passing on the merits when that would leave the challenged statutes or programs in operation. He described and catalogued a vast arsenal of techniques for achieving that end. 6
The dismissal for mootness in DeFunis surely seems to deserve
characterization as an avoidance decision. The possibility that the case
might become moot was known to the Court before it decided to take
the case for review. The Court had actually requested the parties to
brief the question of mootness and had received the memoranda before
certiorari was granted in mid-November 1973." The University stated
that if DeFunis registered for the spring quarter by March 1st, "that
registration would not be cancelled unilaterally by the university regardless of the outcome of this litigation." ' The hearing was nevertheless allowed to come up in due course-at the end of February. Then,
having heard full argument exactly three days before the beginning of
that final spring quarter, a majority of the Court two months later held
that the case should be dismissed as moot.' 9
The Court's action, of course, let affirmative action programs conmight yet prevent DeFunis' graduation at the end of the then current term, and more generally,
that the issue was appropriate for Court resolution in this case. Id. at 348-50.
1, C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).

15 A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 69-72.
16Id. at 111-98. I do not mean to suggest that I consider these techniques all of equal propriety; in fact, they range in my judgement from the entirely proper to others of entirely dubious
propriety. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 240-41, 656-62 (2d ed. 1973); see also Gun-

ther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in
JudicialReview", 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (critique of Bickels thesis).
17 Defunis, 416 U.S. at 315.
18 Defunis, 416 U.S. at 316 n.3.
19 Defunis was decided on April 23, 1974. The technical correctness of the mootness holding
is debatable. There was, as the dissenters pointed out, some possibility that DeFunis would for
one reason or another fail to complete that quarter successfully. Once DeFunis graduated, a holding of mootness would seem clearly justified. But waiting the extra few weeks for that would have
made even more obvious that the Court was seeking a means to avoid deciding the merits. As it is,
that inference seems clear enough.
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tinue, in the University of Washington and elsewhere. On Professor
Bickel's theory, the dismissal was most easily justified as an avoidance
technique on the premise that, had the Court addressed the merits, it
would have held the program to be valid. In that case the mootness
dismissal would have been a means of continuing the programs without
giving them the positive legitimation of Court approval.
Whether that was actually the view of the majority is, of course,
impossible to say. There is some suggestion that this might be the case
from the fact that Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall
were the ones who dissented on the mootness issue.20 Considering their
general substantive stance on related matters, one might be tempted to
draw the inference that they believed that if the Court did address the
merits, a majority would uphold the race-conscious special admissions
program. That inference, however, may be too simple by half-or at
least by a quarter-as Justice Douglas' separate individual opinion on
the merits revealed. 1 But it does seem safe to say that, at the least, a
majority was willing to see these programs continue in operation for
some further period, to gain additional experience if nothing else.2
The most recent case in this series has some interesting parallels to
the DeFunis disposition. In Minnick v. California Department of Corrections,2" the Court also granted certiorari, received full briefs and
SO Defunis, 416

U.S. at 320, 348.
" His was the only opinion that reached the merits. On the broad issues the opinion equivocated, ultimately going off on the suggestion that there might be bias in law school admissions tests
and urging remand for consideration of the question. But a stressed and repeated theme was
"[w]hatever his race, [Defunis] had a constitutional right to have his application considered on its
individual merits in a racially neutral manner." Id. at 336-37; see id. at 343-44.
" It is arguable that, for this objective, the Court could and should have simply denied certiorari in DeFunisin the first place. It is perhaps sufficient to point out that such an action, with its
traditional absence of explanation, would have most obviously attracted charges of willful shirking
on a tough, crucial issue. Beyond that, even bare denial of certiorari is not uncommonly taken as
signifying approval of the result below. This is true of lower courts, particularly where certiorari
was denied "despite the great importance and controversial nature" of the prior decision. See
Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1277-78 (1979). Whether
or not such an inference may occasionally be justified on close professional examination, the reaction of journalists, headline writers, and the public is not likely to be that carefully restrained.
A suggestion of deliberate shirking or implicit approval-or a combination of the two-would
have been particularly likely in DeFunis.In that case, Supreme Court jurisdiction was invoked by
appeal (asserted to be as of right). That appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. DeFunis,
414 U.S. 1038 (1973). Combining that dismissal with a denial of certiorari might have strongly
suggested evasion of the issue, especially because the dismissal of the appeal was itself not clearly
compelled. It presumably went off on the basis that the University of Washington's program was
not a "statute" within 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). But .Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)
(state supreme court order held to be statute for purposes of § 1257(2)); Hamilton v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (Regents' order requiring a course held to be statute).
Note, further, that the combination of the dismissal with denial of certiorari might more readily
have been construed by the media and the public as approval of the decision below. See discussion
of the Minnick case, infra text accompanying notes 26-35.
452 U.S. 105 (1981).
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heard oral argument, and thereafter dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds without reaching the merits. But the issues and the setting
were different.
Between Defunis and Minnick, the Court passed on the constitutionality of affirmative action in two cases. The Bakke case,"4 you will
recall, involved a challenge to the special admissions program of the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, under which
16 places out of each class of 100 were "set aside" for qualified disadvantaged minority students who were selected for admission through a
special Admissions Committee subgroup made up in good part of minority members. The Supreme Court, by one vote of 5-4, held that
specific program invalid and ordered Bakke admitted to the Davis
Medical School. At the same time, the Court also expressly held, by a
different 5-4 vote, that race could be used expicitly as a "plus" factor in
selecting students for admission to medical, law, or other university
schools. The Bakke decision was, of course, the crucial case in this series and we shall come back to discuss it in some detail.
The voting configuration and opinions in Bakke left uncertain,
among other things, the ultimate significance of the use of a numerical
set-aside (as distinguished from more indirect methods), and the relevance of the fact that the program there had been adopted by the University rather than by the general legislature. These two elements (and
some others) came before the Court two years later in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,2 5 involving the validity of an Act of Congress requiring that
at least 10 percent of the federal funds granted for local public works
projects must ordinarily be used by the state or local grantee to
purchase goods or services from minority-owned businesses. A majority
of the Supreme Court upheld this set-aside. The vote this time was 6-3,
but again there were a number of separate opinions and no single
"Opinion of the Court" supported by a majority vote.26
The Court granted certiorari in Minnick on the same day that
Fullilove came down. Minnick involved an affirmative action plan
2' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
20 Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion upholding the set-aside which was joined by Jus-

tices White and Powell, the latter also writing separately. Justices Brennan and Blackmum joined
Justice Marshall's opinion, which also upheld the set-aside. Joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Stewart dissented, as did Justice Stevens separately. The opinion of the Chief Justice stressed
deference to the power of Congress and its necessary latitude to remedy the effects of past discrimination. See 448 U.S. at 490. Justice Marshall's opinion found the set-aside constitutionally valid
since it sought to serve the important governmental objective of remedying the present effects of
past racial discrimination and was in fact substantially related to the achievement of that remedial
purpose. 448 U.S. at 519-21.
27 July 2, 1980. Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1979), cert. granted 448 U.S. 910 (1980).
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adopted by the California Department of Corrections setting forth a
five-year goal of employing 36 percent minorities and 38 percent
women in the Department's personnel. 28 These figures represented
substantial increases above existing levels. The plan had been adopted
by a state agency, not the general legislature. Moreover, it used definite
numbers, although apparently as goals subject to some flexibility. Of
potentially even greater significance, however, the percentages set out in
the plan in Minnick were not only larger, but perhaps even of a different order, from the proportions in the cases previously decided by the
Court. In Bakke and in Fu1Iilove, the figures used in the "set-asides"
were in each case significantly below the percentage of the identified
minorities in the population. In Minnick, however, the figure for
women explicitly represented the percentage of women in the total labor force in California, while the proportion for minorities exceeded
that in the labor force (and the general population) and was apparently
linked to the percentage of minorities in the inmate population of the
Department's prisons.29 Not only were these numbers relatively high,
they seemed to be chosen on two different standards with neither a
ready explanation for their choice nor apparent consistency in their
rationale.
The Court dismissed the case without going to the merits, in the
main suggesting that the decision below was not "final" within the
meaning of the jurisdictional statute. The somewhat labored opinion
cited "significant ambiguities in the record""0 and relied on the fact that
the trial court proceedings in the case had taken place before the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke. The holding may have been technically supportable. It is also true, however, that the bases for this conclusion were generally available at the time of the original decision to
grant certiorari.
In one aspect this may appear, like DeFunis, a classical instance
of a Bickelian avoidance technique. The technical holding of dismissal
on jurisdictional grounds left standing a California intermediate appellate court decision that generally upheld the affirmative action plan.31
At least until some future litigation and decisions, this program-and
presumably others like it-was permitted to go on. Were Bickel's theory governing, one would presume that this action rested upon an internal judgment that if the merits had been addressed, the program
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 109 (1981).
Id. at 109-10.
30 Id. at 127.
31 Id. at 116.
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would have been upheld as valid."2 I doubt, however, that there is any
basis, at least externally, for a reliable inference that this is so.
My own speculation is that the Court majority has not gone that
far. The one thing we can be sure of is that there were at least four
votes to grant certiorari. From that point forward, all is speculation. It
does seem significant that certiorari was granted on the same day that
Fullilove was handed down. From one aspect, this might suggest that
the decision to grant could have been motivated by concern that simply
letting the result in Minnick stand, at the same time that the set-aside
in Fullilove was upheld, might be taken as implying broad acceptance
of affirmative action programs. A vote, or decision, on this basis would
then be entirely consistent with readiness to dismiss certiorari and avoid
addressing the merits at a later point. 3
Alternatively, one might view the grant of certiorari in Minnick as
a decision to consider the merits. This could represent a continuation of
debate within the Court. Minnick was a testing case for the rationales
advanced by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in their Fullilove
opinions. Those opinions put heavy stress on the powers of Congress,
on its general authority and particular responsibility to determine and
remedy the lingering effects of past societal discrimination, and upon
the proposition that Congress had specifically addressed these problems
in devising the remedy under attack in Fullilove." The facts of Minnick, in this dimension, might be seen to pose a particularly difficult
case: the California Department of Corrections might well be viewed as
having no more general legislative authority than the University of California Regents, and the use of the numerical percentages could easily
be analogized to the "set-aside" percent in Bakke. Moreover, the particular percentages used in the Corrections Department plan might also
be seen to make it generally more vulnerable; the figure as to women
was directly proportional to the work force, while the minority percentage was higher still. That sort of proportionality, especially with the
use of two disparate rationales, is harder to justify as solely remedial of
past discrimination.
From this perspective, Minnick might be seen as posing particular
difficulty for the Justices whose votes made the majorities that sustained race-conscious affirmative action in Bakke and Fullilove. Further, if there were a desire on the part of a majority to "send a signal"
that affirmative action plans were going to be subject to closer judicial
3,

See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.

One can find some confirmation of this in the way the oral argument proceeded. See summary at 49 U.S.L.W. 3417-19 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1980).
" See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 472-92, 495-517.
33
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scrutiny, or perhaps even to imply some heightened caution or disapproval, Minnick probably provided as good a vehicle as any for invalidating a plan. Yet when the chips were down, every member of the
Court except Justice Stewart voted to dispatch the case without a holding on the merits. 5 On this basis I infer that a majority is at this point
not willing to announce such invalidation. It is surely too much to infer
a broad commitment to uphold affirmative action plans, but it does
seem that a majority of the Court is not especially eager to invalidate
such plans, at least for the present.
The Court's handling of Minnick, like its handling of DeFunis,
clearly communicates a sense of uncertainty. In terms of the Court as a
whole, it might also be thought to communicate ambivalence. Neither
the grant of certiorari nor the dismissal was inevitable. The net result
of both appears to be a studied avoidance of even implied approval or
disapproval of a wide range of affirmative action plans. Whether or not
that impression is accurate, DeFunis and Minnick can be read as revealing the difficulties encountered by a conscientious Court-or, rather
conscientious Justices-in trying to deal with one of our society's intractable problems. One can readily infer that for a number of the Justices the problem involves not merely uncertainty but the ambivalence
that goes with recognition that there are strong claims, strong moral
claims, on both sides.
The opinions and positions in Fullilove, as well, may be seen as
sending relatively conventional signals of uncertainty that reflect ambivalence. But Fullilove followed Bakke. Its holding made clear what
might only have been guessed or inferred previously: a majority of the
Court could be found to uphold at least some race-conscious affirmative
action programs justified as remedying the lingering effects of past societal discrimination."6 The techniques which the Fullilove decision used
to communicate caution, uncertainty, or ambivalence were not unusual
techniques for narrowing a holding and stressing that narrowness.
Bakke had made clear that there were four votes willing to sustain
'5 452 U.S. 105 (1981). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court; Justices Rehnquist
and Brennan each concurred separately in the dismissal; Justice Stewart dissented.
3s Between Bakke and Fullilove the Court decided United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979). There Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a
collective-bargaining agreement reserving 50% of the openings in craft-training programs for black
employees, until the percentage of black craftworkers in a plant equaled that in the local labor
force, did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In upholding the affirmative action
plan, the Court relied on the fact that its purposes mirrored those of Title VII in that both aimed
to break old patterns of racial segregation and open new employment opportunities for blacks. Id.
at 208. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's opinion, Justice Blackmun also concurring separately. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, who also filed a dissenting opinion. Justices Powell and Stevens did not take part in the
decision.
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the general range of moderate affirmative action programs as remedies
for societal discrimination. It also made clear that there were several
other Justices who might vote to sustain certain race-conscious programs, but who were neither overtly nor broadly committed to doing so.
Justice Powell made that clear as to himself by a separate opinion. The
exquisitely narrow scope of the opinion by Justice Stevens 7 (speaking
for the four who joined in holding the Davis program invalid) strongly
suggested, in my judgment, that one or more of those who signed that
opinion (including Chief Justice Burger as well as Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens) might hold such a view. In fact, the opinions
of the Chief Justice and Justice Powell in Fullilove established that
they were both willing to sustain some generally remedial race-conscious measures-at least when enacted by Congress. Both opinions,
and the Chief Justice's in particular, by explicitly stressing a narrow
view of the facts that may be seen as peculiar to the particular case,
clearly signaled, in a fairly usual common law manner, incremental
movement and an unwillingness to commit to a broad rule or principle
of law. 8
Bakke was different. There the stance of the Court as a whole
amounted to a proclamation of ambivalence that dramatically recognized and proclaimed the existence of legitimate moral and constitutional claims on both sides of the issue. By the time the Bakke case
came before the Supreme Court, it seemed that a choice would have to
be made, ineluctably, between the concept of colorblindness as a wellnigh universal requirement, presently as well as in the long run, and
the perception that remedial race-conscious programs are necessary
means to achieve real equality. 9 Almost needless to say, each of these
polar positions was held with deep conviction and deeply felt emotion
3 See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
33 Justice Stevens' separate dissenting opinion in Fullilove,448 U.S. at 532, which took as its
lodestar a judicial judgment about the adequacy of Congress's deliberation and address of the
issue, was unique because of its relatively unconventional analysis. Nevertheless, since he concluded that the congressional processes underlying the "minority business enterprise" set-aside
were not sufficient to sustain its validity, he clearly signalled his hesitancy in sustaining any raceconscious plans.
" The hope (and convenient belief) that absolute colorblindness and real racial equality were
not inconsistent in the short run may have been tenable at earlier points. See, e.g., the opinions of
Justice Douglas in DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 336-37, 343-44, and of Justice Mosk in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. in the California Supreme Court. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976). In my judgment, however, it really could not survive the substantial
amount of relevant data that was released by the law and medical school testing groups after the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bakke. See Evans, Applications and Admissions to ABA Accredited Law Schools: An Analysis of National Datafor the Class Enteringin the
Fall of 1976, 3 REPORTS OF LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL SPONSORED RESEARCH 551
(1977); B. Waldman, Economic and Racial Disadvantage as Reflected in Traditional Medical
School Selection Factors: A Study of 1976 Applicants to U. S. Medical Schools (Ass'n. Am. Med.
Colleges 1977).
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that reflected belief that it was morally and righteously based. Yet in
Bakke, Justice Powell, with the acquiescence if not the active cooperation of at least several of his colleagues, managed to mark out a position
that served to heal wounds and to defuse emotion.
In some ways the action is reminiscent of the old story of the religious dispute in a Jewish ghetto. After much argument and heating of
tempers, both parties to the argument went to seek out the rabbi. They
found him, and the first volubly poured out his argument. When he
stopped, the rabbi said, "You're right." At that point the antagonist
protested that the rabbi had not heard his side, and the rabbi let him
proceed to state it. When he concluded, the rabbi said, "You're right."
At that point one in the crowd that had gathered intervened, saying,
"But Rabbi, they can't both be right." To which the rabbi responded,
"You're right too." Yet, in Bakke, somehow it worked. The emotion
that had grown and swept the country, that had sharply divided former
allies, and that seemed to threaten complete irreconciliability, began to
resume manageable proportions.
The principal author of this solution appears to be Justice Powell.
It was his vote, and even more, his singular (in both senses) opinion,
that produced what has been called the "Solomonic" result in Bakke. I
said earlier that I thought this was brought about with at least the
acquiescence of one or more of his colleagues. That is, of course, purely
speculative on my part. I recognize that the Court comes together to
plan a joint strategy only in the rarest circumstances. While Bakke may
well have been a sufficiently important case to warrant the development
of a concerted strategy and tactic, my speculation does not go that far.
It is rather that I am struck by the extraordinary silence of those who
joined in the exceedingly narrow opinion by Justice Stevens.40 That
opinion contained not one word suggesting that the Constitution embodies a requirement of colorblindness. Considering the ready availability of the rhetoric to express that position-some of which was even
incorporated by Justice Powell in his opinion 4 -the omission could
hardly be accidental. We know from later cases and opinions that Justices Stewart and Rehnquist do generally espouse the principle of a
colorblind Constitution.4 2 The fact that neither of them, nor any other
Justice, wrote an opinion along those lines seems quite significant. An
eloquent statement of that position-and a strong rhetorical attack on
40 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
41E.g., id. at 289-91.
42 See, e.g., Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 127 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. concurring); id. at 128-29 (Stewart, J. dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
522-26 (1980) (Stewart, J. dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
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the majority holding that properly designed race-conscious admissions
programs were valid-might well have nullified the peace-making and
calming effect of the Powell position.
Of course, even if this is so, it does not follow that the other Justices refrained from separate statement for that reason. But one cannot
help wondering. It is true that the result could have been brought about
through negotiation by only one of those who signed the Stevens opinion. One Justice might have insisted as a condition for his joinder that
that narrow opinion be the exclusive forum for that side of the case;
such arrangements as to the scope of opinions, in exchange for joinder,
are neither unusual nor improper. The question remains, however,
why the others on that side of the issue would agree to silence. Many
possibilities exist, including the desire not to force an uncertain colleague to an undesired resolution of the broad issue. Instead, it could
have reflected a tactical judgment that a "colorblindness" position conspicuously espoused by only one or two members, which others clearly
refrained from joining, might signal weakness more than silence would.
It is not inconsistent with that perception, and entirely possible in my
view, that the agreement on a single, narrow opinion to speak exclusively for all four may have been influenced by conscious participation
in a pattern that would communicate for the Court an overall note of
ambivalence.
The four who favored clear upholding of race-conscious affirmative action programs-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-did not restrict themselves to one opinion. But on the central
core issue they not only joined in a single opinion but took the very
unusual step of naming each of them as a full coauthor (rather than
merely joining a singly authored opinion). This served to fill out the
Court's ambivalent stance.4 8
While the cooperation of others may have been helpful, and perhaps even necessary, to bring about the desired effects, the principal
architect of the Bakke disposition appears to have been Justice Powell.
His was, in any event, the pivotal position. To understand how this
came about it is necessary to consider first the positions taken by the
other Justices.
The opinion by Justice Stevens was, as I noted, exceedingly narThe general point may be sharpened by considering the available alternatives. These four
Justices might conceivably have concurred narrowly in Justice Powell's specific position sustaining
academic special admission programs on "diversity" grounds. The outcome of the Bakke case
would have been unchanged, but the effect would have appeared more one-sidedly a vindication of
Mr. Bakke's position and would have carried much less recognition of the justification for affirmative action programs generally. The note sounded then would have been uncertain or equivocal,
but not clearly one of ambivalence.
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row. It viewed the record below in a most constricted fashion, as
presenting only the issue of Allan Bakke's right to admission, and thus
the validity of the Davis Medical School program only as regarded his
application; the opinion contended that the case did not pose any issue
regarding the general validity of race-conscious programs."" In addition,
it refrained from addressing the constitutional issue even as regards
Mr. Bakke and placed its holding instead exclusively on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.," The opinion was no broader than absolutely
essential to decide the particular case and, as I have noted, no Justice
who joined that opinion wrote separately.
The other opinion that spoke for four was, as I noted, jointly authored by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. This
group held, first, that the substantive prohibitions of Title VI were coextensive with those of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, serving to extend its requirements to private recipients of
federal funds. 46 They then addressed the constitutional question, concluding after extended consideration that race-conscious affirmative action programs are valid so long as they are substantially related to an
important governmental interest.' They held that the state interest in
remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination was sufficiently
important to justify race-conscious special admissions programs in uni48
versities-including the program at the Davis Medical School.
Justice Powell, of course, wrote for himself alone. He joined the
Brennan group in holding that Title VI barred no more than did the
fourteenth amendment, 4 but disagreed with them on the appropriate
standard under that amendment. In his view, any race-conscious program had to survive "strict scrutiny," defined as necessary to further a
substantial state interest. 50 Examining the various justifications proffered by the University, he concluded that the only one he considered
acceptable in this case was the academic freedom of universities to select their own students combined with the academic interest in having a
diverse student body. 1 He considered that interest to be of constitu4 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-11.
Id. at 411-12, 421.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 287.
50 Id. at 291, 305.
61 Id. at 307-12. He ruled out the rectification of societal discrimination on the grounds that
the Regents of the University of California were not authorized to make a determination regarding
such discrimination. Id. at 307-10. He thus reserved the possibility that such justification would be
sufficient if found and acted upon by a body charged with general responsibility for dealing with
such issues and, under those conditions, could support numerical set-asides. As mentioned previously, he found those conditions satisfied by Congress acting in the statute challenged in Fullilove.
45
49
47
48
49
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tional dimension, invoking the first amendment.
Much scholarly attention has been focused on the difference in
standards of validity articulated by Justice Powell and by the group of
Justice Brennan et al.52 Though of course significant,53 that was not
the cardinal difference between them. It was, rather, Justice Powell's
exclusive reliance upon the justification of academic diversity. He found
that interest "compelling," but said that it would only support giving
minority applicants a "plus" in an admissions process in which each
applicant was compared with every other." In his view, it would not
support a program with a definite set-aside of places for minority students, nor one where minority applications were considered separately
from all others; those features were not "necessary" for the goal. 5 The
Davis Medical School program, of course, had the latter features. On
this basis, he found that program invalid and cast the fifth and deciding
vote that affirmed the order admitting Mr. Bakke to the Davis Medical
School.56 At the same time, since his position explicitly recognized the
validity of a race-conscious admissions program that did not contain the
objectionable features, he cast the fifth and deciding vote for an explicit
holding of the Court that race-conscious programs of appropriate design were valid.57
Justice Powell's stance gave a victory to each side of the heated
dispute. It did so at the very least on the symbolic level. The newspaper
headlines and television news summaries that ended the public's suspense about the case shouted that "Bakke wins" but were immediately
accompanied by a further headline that race-conscious programs were
not unconstitutional.
That symbolic posture was important in defusing and calming the
intense emotional division that had seized the nation on this issue. Its
success was not a result of giving each party an equal half of the loaf. I
do not think it is partisanship that leads me to say that the principal
effect of the Bakke decision, by far, was to sustain race-conscious speSee supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
52 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Supp. 1979) 89-92; Greenawalt,

The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 105-14 (1979);
O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 143, 145-50 (1979).
The opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, while characterizing
their standard as a "strict" one, required only that race-conscious affirmative action be substantially related to an important state interest. 438 U.S. at 359.
For a careful analysis of these and the other positions in this entire line of cases, see Choper,
The Constitutionalityof Afflrmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 KY. L.J. 1 (1981-

82).

" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18.

"Id.
S

Id. at 320.

57 rd.
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cial admissions programs throughout the nation. Most of these programs did not contain the set-aside or separate channel features that
Justice Powell found objectionable, and those that did were easily revised to meet his demands. The experience following the Bakke decision was that the vast range of race-conscious programs of special admissions to universities continued in full force and effect. Despite initial
dire forecasts that the decision would result in sharply reduced applications and admissions to professional schools, the actual results showed
no such diminution. Moreover, although Mr. Bakke was admitted to
medical school, it is hard to find any other persons who were ordered
admitted to universities as a result of the case. Indeed, I know of only
one appellate court decision of a Bakke-like suit filed after the Supreme
Court decision-and the plaintiff in that did not succeed. 9
What I believe made Justice Powell's ambivalent stand effective,
and what made the symbolism important, was not any equal or nearequal division of outcomes. Although that may have been the initial
impression, I do not believe it has been the lasting one; the continued
existence of affirmative action programs is too evident on all sides. The
reasons for success in healing the nation's wounds, in my judgment, lay
in a different direction altogether. It was rather that the stance taken
by the Supreme Court as a result of Justice Powell's position both symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held moral
claims on both sides. To those who supported the race-conscious programs, its holding that they might generally continue certainly did that.
Though Mr. Bakke's specific victory exerted a powerful impact initially, it did not take long for supporters of those programs to realize
how much of what they sought had been validated. 60 To those who
" An article written a year after the Bakke decision was handed down and based on the
judgments of a number of educational and professional organizations monitoring reaction to the
decision, concluded that "the Supreme Court's Bakke decision has had virtually no effect on minority-group enrollments at most colleges and universities." Middleton, Bakke Ruling Seen Having Little Effect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 30, 1979, at 1. Figures on minority group enrollment in United States medical schools compiled by the Association of American Medical Colleges
corroborate these conclusions. They show selected minorities increasing from 8.8% of total first
year enrollment in 1978-79 to 9.1% in 1979-80, the first year (and therefore likely the principal
one) in which the Bakke decision would have been reflected in admission totals. ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1983-84: UNITED

STATES AND CANADA 49, table 7-A (1982). Law school figures similarly fail to show any significant drop in minority admissions coincident with Bakke. Thus, an ABA survey of minority group
students enrolled in J.D. programs in approved law schools shows 9,922 such students, or 8.16%
of the total, enrolled in 1978-79; 10,008, or 8.15% of the total enrolled in 1979-80. (Available
later figures show some increases: 10,574, or 8.43%, in 1980-81; and 11,130, or 8.74% of the total,
in 1981-82.) AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED

STATES 1981-82: LAW SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 51, 53 (1981).
"' Doherty v. Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff did not
meet criteria for acceptance for any of places thus not injured by the plan).
" Indeed, there was a specific section in the Powell opinion that was joined explicitly by
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strenuously opposed such programs, the publicly heralded victory of
Mr. Bakke itself implicitly legitimated their position. In addition, Justice Powell's opinion expressed clear support for the view that racial or
ethnic lines are inherently constitutionally suspect. (As noted earlier,
although the Stevens opinion did not in terms substantially reinforce
this position, its expression in the Powell opinion went undiminished
by anything said by the Justices joining the Stevens position.) Further,
the result reached by the Court effectively required the abandonment of
explicit numerical set-asides or other rigid features that evoked memories of exclusionary quotas or other traditional instruments of hostile
and invidious discrimination.
It is striking how effective the Bakke disposition was in reducing
the level and intensity of heat surrounding the issue of race-conscious
affirmative action. Such reduction in tensions is by no means an inevitable result of a Supreme Court decision on a major constitutional issue. One need only think of the abortion cases to illustrate that a Supreme Court decision may indeed have the opposite effect."1 The
experience with the abortion issue may also help cast further light.6 2 In
the first abortion cases63 the Court unequivocally took a stance on one
side of the issue. Because of the status and role of the Supreme Court
in our system, such a decision by the Court tends to carry with it a note
of morality; the holding that a woman has a constitutional right to an
abortion is to an important degree taken as implying that those who
oppose it are morally wrong. That implication, or overtone, is likely to
breed resentment and a strong emotional counterreaction. One need
only contrast the relatively quiet acceptance by the "right to life" forces
of ordinary legislative defeats (which had occurred) with the intensely
emotional response to the Supreme Court's actions. Other factors may,
of course, play a part, including the very real difference in the obstacles
to overturning the defeat. But I think the element of moral condemnation, and the resentment it understandably engenders, is a real and important phenomenon. Justice Powell's pivotal stance in the Bakke case
enabled the Court to avoid that phenomenon.
Justice Powell's vehicle for accomplishing this feat was acceptance
of the importance of "diversity" in the academic setting. The use of the
"academic diversity" justification had a number of effects. It by-passed
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-thus constituting it an official Opinion of the
Court-which recognized that a state may validly have "a properly devised admissions program
invlving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272

n.,

320.
61 See infra text accompanying note 79.
42 See infra text accompanying note 82.
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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the issue of whether undoing the effects of societal discrimination would
be a sufficient justification for a set-aside enacted by a general legislature, and thus avoided any commitment (even by implication) regarding
affirmative action programs in employment or other nonacademic areas.
It tended to equate race with other variables (such as athletic ability,
geographic origin, or alumni relations) that seem more acceptable generally and do not carry the same emotional freight as racial or ethnic
lines do. Justice Powell capitalized on this tendency by stating that a
program based upon academic diversity could not on its face make race
a separate determinative criterion.14 He took the position that the goal
of diversity could only support the use of race as a "plus" factor in a
selection process in which various elements (academic and other) are
weighed and in which each applicant is compared to all others. He
held, further, that it could not be used to justify numerical targets,
"quotas," or set-asides.6 5 The last two requirements were crucial to his
position that the Davis Medical School program was invalid, and that
Bakke, therefore, had to be admitted, while the general run of raceconscious special admissions programs either were valid or could be
made so with relative ease.
Justice Powell's position produces a result that makes a good deal
of intuitive sense. But its justification on a principled, constitutional
level is more problematic. The rationale advanced in the opinion proceeds from the principle that academic freedom, protected by the first
amendment, encompasses selection of students. Justice Powell then advances an interest in diversity of students as the acceptable "compelling" academic interest required by strict scrutiny standards. One may
question why academic freedom allows only a choice of diversity as a
goal. In terms of first amendment concerns, why should a university
have less constitutional freedom to opt for homogeneity in particular
respects-e.g., to select for specific programs only those with certain
majors or interests, or particular career objectives, or only urban-or
rural-residents? As long as the operative criterion is not racial or ethnic,"6 there would seem to be no problem with homogeneity as a goal.
If a racial criterion is applied, however, then it may well be doubted
that the action would be upheld as constitutional. But then it may be
questioned whether a university's choice for diversity of students can
rise any higher.
On one level, Justice Powell's opinion apparently accepts. that it
cannot. He takes the position that a special admissions program in
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 315-18.
"Or any other that invokes special scrutiny, such as religious or political criteria.
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which race is explicitly determinative is invalid, and cannot be justified
on the basis of achieving a diversity objective. At the same time, he
upholds the use of race as a "plus" factor on that very basis, saying:
This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses
out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a
"plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because
he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which
may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would
have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would
have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the
67
Fourteenth Amendment.
With all respect, I believe it is open to question whether the reasoning
and "principle" contained in this passage could be applied generally.
There would seem to be no a priori reason why a "minus" should be
treated differently from a "plus" factor-used in precisely the same sort
of calculus-and yet I consider it most unlikely that the Court (or Justice Powell) would uphold a program seeking diversity by assigning
such a "minus" to membership in a racial or ethnic group considered to
be overly represented in a student body chosen to achieve "diversity."
The difference may lie in acceptance of the proposition that giving
affirmative consideration to race is in fact a necessary means of including significant numbers of minority members in the student bodies of
highly selective medical, law, or other university schools." There was
substantial demonstration of this in the Bakke briefs and, although that
conclusion is not expressly articulated, it seems a fair reading of Justice
Powell's opinion to view it as predicated on that necessity."
Once that objective, and necessity for its achievement, is accepted
as sufficient justification, the question arises why an explicit race-determinative or even "set-aside" type of program is unacceptable. Such a
program may surely be an effective way to reach the desired objective.
Indeed, it may be the most efficient way. Consider a not atypical situa67 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.

" This would also be consistent with the expectation that Justice Powell (and a majority of
the Court) would not be likely to uphold a program meeting the quoted description which used so
high a "plus" that specific minorities were disproportionately heavily represented.
" Certainly his position explicitly rests upon acceptance of educators' judgment that additional racial and ethnic representation must be actively sought if desired diversity is to be achieved.
See Bakke at 311-15, 324 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
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tion. Assume that a law school finds that the use of strictly academic
criteria (e.g., college record and test scores) will actually produce a
widely diverse student body, and that over the years this method has
produced a quite varied and broad-spectrum student group-with one
very notable exception: the group is virtually all white. (This is far
from fictitious.) Under these circumstances, efforts to achieve greater
diversity need call for nothing more than a special admissions program
on race-conscious lines alone. Indeed, that would be the simplest, most
efficient, and least costly system. 0
It seems unlikely that such a program would be upheld under
Bakke as decided. The language of Justice Powell's opinion does not
absolutely preclude the possibility, but its major thrust would seem to
rule out any program framed explicitly in terms of race (or ethnic
background) as the sole preferential factor. This would seem beyond
question if the program were set up in terms of a separate, explicitly
race-based channel for passing on applications and a set-aside of a
stated number of places. Justice Powell maintained that such explicitly
race-based programs are not justifiable as "necessary" to a compelling
interest because the more indirect kind of program, that he would up71
hold, assures individual consideration of each person.
Yet, this must to the largest degree be a matter of form rather than
substance. There is, after all, no objective way to compute the "edge" to
be given to race or ethnic background as compared to any other factor.
If an admissions committee is allowed to give a "plus" for race as a
means of achieving diversity in the student body, that "plus" must be
large enough to make a difference in the outcome in some cases. But if
that is so, isn't it clear that the size of the "plus" will determine the
number of minority students admitted? In those circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that the authorities that determine the size of the
"plus" will set that size in terms of the number of minority students
likely to be produced at the level set. Since that is so, the use of a
"plus" may simply be a slightly less precise, and less direct, method of
determining the proportion of minority students who will be given preferential admission. 2 The choice of one method or the other may make
a difference in the marginal case; for 'the last available seat' (assuming
selection proceeds in that fashion), the use of a "plus" approach may
produce a "gestalt" or overall "squint" comparison of the top-ranked
unadmitted majority and minority candidates. But for the vast bulk of
70 In these circumstances, it could not be said that a program "focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity." 438 U.S. at 315.
71 438 U.S. at 318 & n.52.
72 See id. at 378-79 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
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applicants, the concept of direct individual comparison will inevitably
be unreal."3
Justice Powell's opinion spoke to a related point; in the paragraph
immediately following the passage quoted above, he continued:
It has been suggested that an admissions program which
considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more
sophisticated-but no less effective-means of according racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference
program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity
exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly against
other elements-in the selection process. "A boundary line,"
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked in another connection,
"is none the worse for being narrow." McLeod v. Dilworth,
322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944). And a court would not assume
that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the
functional equivalent of a quota system.7 4
But this statement does not explain why an explicitly announced
"plus" for membership in a racial or ethnic group does not in this context present a "facial intent to discriminate" or a "facial infirmity."
The fact that the announcement may equate race with other, generally
acceptable factors cannot be the answer. It is certainly hard to consider
such a policy "facially nondiscriminatory"-and it would surely not be
so considered in the general run of circumstances. Yet there can hardly
be doubt that Justice Powell's position would uphold the validity of a
75
special admissions program so conceived and so described.
The crucial difference appears to be that explicit "set-aside" programs are not considered "necessary" when more indirect programs
will serve. The former are deemed to require more justification than
the latter. In my judgment, there is a sound basis for this. The use of a
"plus" is not the same as a "quota" or a "set-aside". Even when the
73 The point here is not that a "plus"-type system may be used as a subterfuge, but that the
system will inevitably work in the vast majority of cases without significant difference from the
"set-aside" format.

74

438 U.S. at 318.

The "Harvard program" advanced by him as an acceptable model contains explicit reference to race. It also expressly avows a goal of enrolling significant numbers of minority students.
The statement, which is attached as an appendix to Justice Powell's opinion, id. at 321-24, does
equate race with other factors to be considered in achieving a diverse class. But such description
would surely not save from invalidity the use of race as a "plus" (or "minus") in any program
that was not to be upheld in any event for other reasons.
7'
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net operative results may be the same, the use of euphemisms may
serve valuable purposes; as do legal fictions, they may facilitate the acceptance of needed measures."8 The indirectness of the less explicitly
numerical systems may have significant advantages, not so much in
terms of the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their
operation over time. The description of race as simply "another factor"
among a lot of others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize
the sense that minority students are separate and different and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and
structured systems might have the opposite effect. These perceptions
can have important consequences for the schools and their students,
both majority and minority. They can facilitate or hamper the development of relationships among individuals and groups; they can advance
or retard the educational process for all-including, particularly, minority students whose self-image is most crucially involved.
Indirectness may also have significant advantages in muting public
reactions to, and possible resentment of, the granting of preference on
racial lines. The use of overt numbers, whether stated as literal quotas
or as "set-asides" for qualified applicants, greatly tends to trigger the
symbolism of the infamous "numerus clausus" and other exclusionary
devices of past invidious religious, ethnic, and racial discrimination.
The incorporation of such features in an institutional admissions program continuing indefinitely from year to year, tends continually to
keep alive consciousness of the program and the relevance of race
therein; it tends to maintain and exacerbate latent and overt hostility to
these efforts to overcome the effects of past racial discrimination. A program formulated along the lines Justice Powell's opinion approves
would, by the very lack of "sharp edges," avoid such visibility in its
operations and tend to enhance the acceptability of the program.
I believe these points are sound, and provide substantial reason for
finding more subtle programs more widely acceptable than those containing more explicit and obtrusive features. I also recognize that wise
and effective government may at times require such indirection and
less-than-full candor. But one can hardly proceed by proclaiming in a
Supreme Court opinion that this is what is happening. It might be
arguable that considerations of the sort described could be founded in
principle rather than prudence or expediency. But they surely do not
lend themselves to formulation into an articulable principle to be announced by the Supreme Court-particularly one to be applied across
6 Professor Jerome Michael's example still seems persuasive: Most of us would balk at
government orders to rise an hour early, go to work an hour early, dine and go to bed an hour
early. But few have difficulty accepting Daylight Savings Time every year.
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the board to all cases that fall within its terms.
I do not make these points to be captious. I do so because they
pose for me a difficult conflict at an elemental level. As I have indicated, I do not believe that the position taken by Justice Powell-and
thus the net outcome in the Bakke case-can be supported by articulated principle. By this I am not referring to the kind of exalted "neutral principle" that Professor Wechsler spoke of." I am using, rather,
the much simpler notion of principle as that which transcends the particular case, is rationally defensible in those general terms, and is analytically adequate to support the result.
At the same time, I consider the Court's stance in Bakke-the ambivalent posture made possible by Justice Powell's opinion (perhaps
with support of others)-to be a wise and politic resolution of an exceedingly difficult social problem. The Court took what was one of the
most heated and polarized issues in the nation, and by its handling
defused much of that heat. To lower the boil in the intense cauldron of
race issues was, in my judgment, no mean nor easy achievement. But I
think the accomplishment went further than that.
Let us consider the implications of the position I have advanced,
which is that the justification of academic diversity would support even
the Davis form of special admissions program."' If Justice Powell had
taken this position, he would not have joined the opinion of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, but he would have voted
with them. The result then would have been complete rejection of the
claim advanced by Mr. Bakke and his supporters. For reasons sketched
earlier, that rejection would likely have engendered deep resentment,
and possibly even a sense of betrayal. That reaction, in turn, could well
have begotten a legislative backlash,"9 such as we have seen in other
highly charged areas of Court decision. Significantly, unlike those other
areas, there is legislative power to undo affirmative action programs,
7

See H. WECHSLER, supra note 3.

7' There is the theoretical possibility that, forced to choose between sustaining explicitly

structured special admissions programs (including Davis') or invalidating all race conscious programs, Justice Powell would have elected the latter course. My own view is that such an outcome
would have produced a disastrous setback in race and other relations in our society generally, and
I doubt that Justice Powell would have chosen that course. (I recognize that I may be projecting,
but it is also an axiom for interpreting court precedents that judges decide outcomes more surely
and more reliably than they provide reasons.) More to the present point, if the driving force for
reconsideration here is the demand for principle, the analysis I have advanced would not lead to
general invalidation of special admissions. As indicated in the text, the academic diversity justification once accepted could, and should, sustain all forms of special admissions programs designed to
achieve that objective.
11 I am not alone in considering such a legislative backlash a real possibility. See Karst &
Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7,
27-29 (1979). It is also true that, even if such a backlash ultimately failed, the pitched battle
precipitated thereby could have had disastrous effects.
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even after the Court has upheld such programs as valid. 0 The result
then might be a return to essentially all-white professional schools, and
possibly also inhibition or even ending of employment programs. That
would in my view represent a clear setback not only in race relations
but in the general conditions of our democratic polity.
Thus, my dilemma. Candor compels me to say that I cannot bring
myself to condemn the net result reached in Bakke. Indeed, I consider it
a major, successful accomplishment. Yet, if I cannot find an analytically
sound principle to support that result, what justification do I have to
support such action by the Supreme Court? In theory, at least, the
Court-as distinguished from other agencies of government-must rest
its decision on an analytically sound principle.
This dilemma is less acute than it would be were Justice Powell's
opinion that of a majority, for then his analysis would have stood as
precedential authority. As it is, his opinion spoke only for himself, and
so does not bind the future. That the crucial opinion, and hence the
disposition as a whole, should thus avoid determining the larger issue
of principle, while yet resolving its competing claims in the moment,
was from one aspect itself a masterful stroke of diplomacy. Yet the issue of principled justification for Supreme Court action remains.
I am not so absolute or so unworldly as to say that results may not
at times be a sufficient justification. Certainly, if the total security of
the nation depended upon a particular Supreme Court result, I would
not think the Court should be deterred from that result if it were unable to articulate at the time a satisfactory supporting principle. That is
in one sense an essential element in successful government. But it is at
the same time an exceedingly dangerous one. Unless cabined, it is an
argument that will always justify desired social outcomes regardless of
principled justifications.
But how could it be cabined here? I cannot assert that I believe
the safety of the United States depended on one outcome or the other in
Bakke. I can say that the case was an extraordinary one, in terms of
public awareness and concern" as well as in terms of the importance
and difficulty of the issues. But such "extraordinary" cases are not so
so Cf. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982) (upholding an amendment to the
state constitution which cut back on state court-ordered busing plans to achieve integration). But
see Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982) (invalidating the result of a statewide initiative which would have prevented school boards from busing for integrative purposes).
81 It hardly seems necessary to document this statement, but if need be, support may be
found in the extraordinary number of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court (a record number),
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 268-70, the fact that the formulation of the amicus position of the government
became headline news in The New York Times, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1977, at 34, col.1, and
the extent of media coverage of the decision in both daily and more extended periodicals. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1978, at Al, col.6.
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uncommon on the dockets of the United States Supreme Court,"2 and
the line between them and the run of other cases is by no means easily
demarcated or maintained. It is true that in Bakke racial relations were
importantly under stress. It is also true that race relations are our most
durable domestic crisis. Is it therefore sufficient to limit the "exception"
to racial matters? Is it justifiable?
The manifest ambivalence and incertitude projected in this entire
line of cases, and in particular the absence of any official "Opinion of
the Court" addressing the merits, may mute these questions. But they
do not obviate them. I have tried but I have not been able to come to
resolution. That may be an unorthodox way to conclude a formal lecture. But that is how I must, and do, conclude this one.

81 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), posed equally unusual problems. See
Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 76 (1974). It too was unquestionably an "extraordinary" case. But can one characterize the
first abortion decisions that way? See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).

